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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Levie Raymond Bullock was convicted of robbery following a jury trial, and was
sentenced to a unified term of ten years, with one year fixed. The jury found Mr. Bullock
guilty of robbery with respect to personal property taken from Jennifer Logan under an
aiding/abetting theory (Count III), but could not reach a verdict with respect to personal
property taken from Michael Wall under the same theory (Count I). Mr. Bullock appeals
from his judgment of conviction, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the
verdict because no rational trier of fact could have found that Mr. Bullock shared the
criminal intent of the principals and that there was a community of purpose in the
unlawful undertaking. Mr. Bullock argues, in the alternative, that his conviction should
be vacated because the jury was not properly instructed on the mental state necessary
for robbery under an aiding/abetting theory, and the failure to properly instruct the jury
constituted fundamental error.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Early one morning, Zachary (“Zach”) Wall was at his residence at the West River
Inn in Garden City, Idaho, with his girlfriend, Jennifer Logan;1 Jennifer’s five-year-old
son; Michael Osborn; and Maritschka Bleau. (6/21/16 Tr., p.177, Ls.17-20, p.178, Ls.710; Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), p.3.) Zach had used methamphetamine

1

Zach Wall and Jennifer Logan were engaged at the time of the incident, but were
married prior to trial. (Tr., p.172, Ls.2-7.) In this brief, Jennifer Logan/Wall will be
referred to as Jennifer Logan. Everyone will be referred to primarily by their first names
for ease of understanding the trial testimony. Some names are spelled differently in the
1

and was “in and out of a seizure.” (6/21/16 Tr., p.172, Ls.12-16.) Jennifer had also
used methamphetamine and was feeling the effects of the drug. (6/21/16 Tr., p.181,
Ls.24-25, p.190, Ls.19-23.) Jennifer was attending to Zach when there was a knock on
the front door. (6/21/16 Tr., p.182, Ls.13-16.) Michael opened the door, and let in
Brandy Moseby, Devon Elmore, Amber Lopez, and Mr. Bullock.2 (6/21/16 Tr., p.182,
L.20 – p.183, L.9, p.198, Ls.19-23; PSI, p.3.) Brandy said her house had been robbed,
and asked Jennifer if she could look to see if her belongings were there. (6/21/16 Tr.,
p.183, L.25 – p.184, L.19.) Jennifer gave Brandy “permission to do that.” (6/21/16 Tr.,
p.184, Ls.20-21.)
Jennifer testified that Devon had a handgun, and that she was threatened by
Devon, Brandy, and Amber. (6/21/16 Tr., p.185, L.3 – p.186, L.4.) Jennifer later told
the police she was attacked by Devon and Brandy.

(6/21/16 Tr., p.192, Ls.2-4.)

Ultimately, several items of personal property were stolen from Zach, including a game
player, multiple games, three cell phones, and a DVD player.

(6/21/16 Tr., p.174,

Ls.10-12; PSI, p.4.) Some of these items were later found in a residence where Devon
apparently lived with Brandy. (6/21/16 Tr., p.174, Ls.10-12; PSI, p.4.) Jennifer testified
that Brandy took some of her money, and that her cell phone was stolen from her.
(6/21/16 Tr., p.201, Ls.17-21.)
Zach reported the incident to the police over a week after it occurred, while he
was incarcerated in the Ada County Jail. (PSI, p.3.) When asked why he did not report

transcript, the record and the PSI. For ease of understanding, all names will be spelled
consistently in this brief, and misspellings will not be noted with brackets.
2
Ms. Logan testified there were five people at the door, but only ever identified four
people. (6/21/16 Tr., p.183, Ls.3-24.)
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the incident sooner, he said Devon and Brandy’s boyfriend were members of the
Severely Violent Criminals (SVC) gang and he was scared. (PSI, p.4.) He testified at
trial that he was worried about “getting a [parole] violation for being under the influence.”
(6/21/16 Tr., p.174, Ls.13-21.)
Mr. Bullock was interviewed about the incident about a month after it occurred,
and the audio recording of the interview was introduced into evidence at trial. (State’s
Ex. 1.) Mr. Bullock said Brandy “made us go to Zach’s house” to find out if he had
robbed her, but “we didn’t know she was going to take his stuff.” (State’s Ex. 1, 04:2004:30.) He said, “We got in the car and went with her. We didn’t have much of a
choice, really.” (State’s Ex. 1, 04:30-04:40.) The detective asked Mr. Bullock if he was
forced to go to Zach’s house, and he answered, “Yeah.” (State’s Ex. 1, 05:00-05:06.)
Mr. Bullock explained he was forced “by intimidation.” (State’s Ex. 1, 05:08-05:13.) He
said Brandy put everything collected from Zach’s house in a laundry basket and put it in
her car. (State’s Ex. 1, 06:05-06:11.)
Mr. Bullock was charged by Information with four counts of robbery—Count I
pertaining to Zachary Wall, Count II pertaining to Michael Osborn, Count III pertaining to
Jennifer Logan, and Count IV pertaining to Maritschka Bleau. (R., pp.52-54.) The State
dismissed Counts II and IV prior to trial. (R., pp.53, 72, 97.) The case proceeded to
trial against Mr. Bullock on Counts I and III under an aiding/abetting theory.
Jennifer testified that the only thing taken from her besides her cell phone was
money, which Brandy took. (6/21/16 Tr., p.201, Ls.17-21.) With respect to her cell
phone, Jennifer first testified that “[Mr. Bullock] was the one that grabbed my phone off
the thing and I asked for it back and he went to hand me my phone back and Brandy
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stopped him.” (6/21/16 Tr., p.194, L.25 – p.195, L.4.) On cross-examination, she was
presented with a transcript of her earlier testimony, and confirmed that she previously
testified that Amber and Brandy took her phone off the television stand. (6/21/16 Tr.,
p.195, Ls.9-23.) On redirect, the prosecutor asked Jennifer again about who took her
cell phone, and the following exchange occurred:
Q.

And [defense counsel] asked about your prior testimony regarding
who took the cell phones. And I’m going to ask some pretty
specifics [SIC]. Would it help you to review that first?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay. So in my review of your answer, you said: “They took my
cell phone and they wouldn’t give it back to me.”

A.

Yes.

Q.

And I asked: Who is they? And what was your answer to that
question?

A.

Brandy and Amber.

Q.

Was it Brandy and Amber for both “theys” on the taking and the not
returning?

A.

On – there was [SIC] multiple cell phones that were mine.

Q.

Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions.

(6/21/16 Tr., p.202, Ls.2-19.)
Mr. Bullock testified that he was at home in bed with his fiancée, Amber, when
Brandy and Devon “came barging through my bedroom door,” and Brandy seemed
extremely angry about her house being robbed. (6/21/16 Tr., p.213, L.24 – p.215, L.13,
p.224, Ls.24-25.) Mr. Bullock denied stealing anything from Brandy and invited her to
look around his house. (6/21/16 Tr. p.215, Ls.14-20.) Devon sprayed bug spray in
Amber’s face, and Mr. Bullock and Devon got into argument, and Devon pulled his
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firearm out to show Mr. Bullock he had a gun. (6/21/16 Tr., p.216, Ls.2-11.) Brandy
and Devon demanded Mr. Bullock and Amber go with them to Zach’s house to see if he
had robbed Brandy. (6/21/16 Tr., p.216, L.24 – p.217, L.12.) Mr. Bullock did not know
Devon well, but knew him by reputation to be a member of the SVC gang. (6/21/16 Tr.,
p.217, Ls.13-22.)
Mr. Bullock went with Brandy and Devon in Brandy’s car to Zach’s house.
(6/21/16 Tr., p.217, L.23 – p.218, L.4.) Mr. Bullock testified that Brandy started arguing
with Jennifer about stuff being stolen, and he just stood there. (6/21/16 Tr., p.218,
L.19 – p.219, L.2.) The following exchange took place between defense counsel and
Mr. Bullock on direct examination:
Q.

And at any point were you gathering items?

A.

No. The only thing that I ever did was touch the cell phone.

Q.

What cell phone was that?

A.

Jennifer Logan’s cell phone.

Q.

How did you know it was her cell phone?

...
Q.

Why did you grab that cell phone?

A.

Because Brandy had instructed me to hand her the phone.

...
Q.

And after you took that phone, what did you do with it?

A.

Well, at first Jennifer started to demand her phone back. So I tried
to hand it to her and then Brandy countered and said: “Give me the
phone.” So I handed it to her. Brandy took the phone and placed it
in the basket.

Q.

During this entire incident, what were your feelings? Were you –
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A.

That I didn’t want to be in this situation at all.

Q.

Okay. Why is that?

A.

I wanted to leave. It had nothing to do with me. I don’t even know
Zach nor do I care about Brandy or her stuff.

Q.

So why were you even there?

A.

Out of fear because of Devon and Brandy being in my house with a
gun.

(6/21/16 Tr., p.219, L.3 – p.220, L.13.)
The prosecutor argued in closing that Mr. Bullock admitted to grabbing Jennifer’s
cell phone and throwing it in the laundry basket. He said, “By his own admission, he
grabbed the cell phone and threw it in the basket.”3 (6/21/16 Tr., p.240, Ls.8-9.) He
continued:
She said it was her cell phone sitting up there. Just because you set your
cell phone down doesn’t mean it’s no longer your cell phone. Your
common sense tells you that. Which the defendant again aided; he
grabbed it off there and dropped it in the basket when Brandy told him to.
He helped her. He helped her grab it and move it there. It may be at her
direction; that doesn’t change the fact that he’s guilty. That he did the act.
(6/21/16 Tr., p.242, Ls.14-22.) Defense counsel argued in closing that “this case all
turns on intent” and that “[Mr. Bullock’s] intent was not to commit a robbery.” (6/21/16
Tr., p.246, L.15, p.247, Ls.12-13.)
The jury was instructed that, in order to find Mr. Bullock guilty of Count III, the
State had to prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.
2.

On or about June 24, 2015
in the State of Idaho

3

Mr. Bullock did not testify that he threw Jennifer’s phone in a laundry basket. He
testified that he gave Jennifer’s phone to Brandy and Brandy put in the laundry basket.
(6/21/16 Tr., p.219, L.22 – p.220, L.3.)
6

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Jennifer Wall, also known as Jennifer Logan, had possession of
personal property,
which the defendant Levie Raymond Bullock aided, abetted,
assisted or helped in taking the property from her person or from
her immediate presence,
against her will,
by the intentional use of force or fear to overcome her will, and
with the intent permanently to deprive her of the property.

(R., p.142; 6/21/16 Tr., p.234, L.25 – p.235, L.17.) The jury was also instructed:
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly participates
in the acts constituting a crime and a person who, either before or during
its commission, intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes,
encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires another to commit a
crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission. Both can be
found guilty of the crime. Mere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent
consent to, the planning or commission of a crime is not [in the absence of
a duty to act] sufficient to make one an accomplice.
(R., p.144; 6/21/16 Tr., p.235, L.24 – p.236, L.10.) The jury asked one question during
the course of its deliberations, “What is the dictionary’s definition of ‘abetted’?” (6/22/16
Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.6, L.4; R., p.157.) The district court responded, in writing, “To abet
another to commit a crime is to command, procure, counsel, encourage, induce or
assist.” (6/22/16 Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.6, L.4; R., p.157.)
After seven hours of deliberation, the jury was not able to reach a verdict on
Count I, but returned a verdict of guilty on Count III. (6/22/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-23, p.9,
Ls.6-23; R., pp.109, 158, 159.) The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss
Count I and then sentenced Mr. Bullock to a unified term of ten years, with one year
fixed. (R., pp.160-61, 163, 164, 167; 9/15/16 Tr., p.276, Ls.3-9.) The judgment of
conviction was entered on September 19, 2016, and Mr. Bullock filed a timely notice of
appeal on September 23, 2016. (R., pp.168-74, 177-79.)
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ISSUES
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Bullock’s robbery conviction?

2.

Was the jury properly instructed on the mental state necessary for robbery under
an aiding/abetting theory?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Bullock’s Robbery Conviction
A.

Introduction
In State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380 (1985), this Court stated that the mental

state required for liability as an aider or abettor “is generally the same as that required
for the underlying offense—the aider and abettor must share the criminal intent of the
principal and there must [be] a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.” Id.
at 386 (quotation marks and citations omitted). On the evidence presented at trial, no
rational trier of fact could have found that Mr. Bullock shared the criminal intent of
Brandy Moseby and Devon Elmore and that there was a community of purpose in the
robbery of Jennifer Logan.

Because Mr. Bullock’s mental state was an essential

element of the offense, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.

B.

Standard of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.” State v.

Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014). “The relevant inquiry is not whether this Court would
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 546 (2015) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
The question for this Court is “whether there is substantial evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could have found that the State met its burden of proving the essential
elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.”
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Id. (quotation marks

omitted). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely
upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.” Id. This Court
“will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight
of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence” but “exercises
free review over questions of law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

C.

No Rational Trier Of Fact Could Have Found That Mr. Bullock Shared The
Criminal Intent Of Brandy Moseby And Devon Elmore And That There Was A
Community Of Purpose In The Robbery Of Jennifer Logan
In order for the State to meet its burden of proving Mr. Bullock’s guilt under an

aiding or abetting theory, it had to present substantial evidence that Mr. Bullock shared
the criminal intent of the principals, Brandy Moseby and Devon Elmore, and that there
was a community of purpose in the robbery of Jennifer Logan. See Scroggins, 110
Idaho at 386; see also State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Aiding
and abetting contemplates a sharing by the aider and abettor of the criminal intent of the
perpetrator.”)

Robbery is defined by statute as “the felonious taking of personal

property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” I. C. § 18-6501. Robbery is a
specific intent crime; it requires a specific intent to both take the victim’s property by use
of force or fear, and to permanently deprive the victim of the property. See State v.
Olin, 111 Idaho 516, 521 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Martinez, 133 Idaho 484, 487 (Ct.
App. 1999). The State failed to present substantial evidence that Mr. Bullock had the
requisite intent to commit robbery.
When Mr. Bullock was interviewed about the incident about a month after it
occurred, he said Brandy “made us go to Zach’s house” to find out if he had robbed her,
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but “we didn’t know she was going to take his stuff.” (State’s Ex. 1, 04:20-04:30.) He
said, “We got in the car and went with her. We didn’t have much of a choice, really.”
(State’s Ex. 1, 04:30-04:40.) At trial, Mr. Bullock testified he went to Zach’s house “[o]ut
of fear” and “wanted to leave” because “[i]t had nothing to do with me” and “I don’t even
know Zach nor do I care about Brandy or her stuff.” (6/21/16 Tr., p.219, L.3 – p.220,
L.13.) There was no direct evidence to the contrary regarding Mr. Bullock’s intent.
Direct evidence is not required to prove intent, of course, as intent “may be
shown by circumstantial evidence, or proven by the defendant’s acts and conduct.”
Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 384. But there was no circumstantial evidence here to support a
finding that Mr. Bullock had the requisite criminal intent, and the extremely limited role
Mr. Bullock played in the robbery simply cannot support an inference that he shared in
Brandy and Devon’s criminal intent to take personal property from Jennifer, and that
there was a community of purpose in such undertaking.
Jennifer Logan testified that Devon had a handgun, and that she was threatened
by Devon, Brandy, and Amber. (6/21/16 Tr., p.185, L.3 – p.186, L.4.) Jennifer later told
the police she was attacked by Devon and Brandy. (6/21/16 Tr., p.192, Ls.2-4.) She
testified that Mr. Bullock “was just listening to what was being told to him” and did not
act on his own volition. (6/21/16 Tr., p.187, Ls.1-4.) The only items taken from Jennifer
were money, which she testified that Brandy took, and her cell phone. (6/21/16 Tr.,
p.201, Ls.17-21.) With respect to her cell phone, Jennifer testified on direct examination
that “[Mr. Bullock] was the one that grabbed my phone off the thing and I asked for it
back and he went to hand me my phone back and Brandy stopped him.” (6/21/16 Tr.,
p.194, L.25 – p.195, L.4.) She later backed away from this testimony, and appeared to
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lay the blame solely on Brandy and Amber.4 Mr. Bullock testified that “[t]he only thing
that I ever did was touch the cell phone,” which he did at Brandy’s instruction. (6/21/16
Tr., p.5, Ls.1-15.) Mr. Bullock testified that he tried to give Jennifer her phone back, but
that Brandy said, “Give me the phone,” so he handed the phone to Brandy, who put it in
the laundry basket. (6/21/16 Tr., p.219, L.22 – p.220, L.3.)
While the evidence presented at trial was arguably sufficient (if barely so) to
prove that Mr. Bullock aided or abetted in taking Jennifer’s property from her person or
her immediate presence, it is insufficient as a matter of law to support an inference that
Mr. Bullock possessed the requisite criminal intent to take Jennifer’s property by use of
force or fear, and to permanently deprive her of that property. As a result, Mr. Bullock’s
robbery conviction must be vacated, and this case must be remanded to the district
court with instruction to enter an acquittal. See, e.g., State v. Curry, 153 Idaho 394, 404
(vacating the judgment of conviction and remanding the case for entry of an acquittal
where the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant’s convictions).

4

On cross examination, Jennifer was presented with a transcript of her earlier
testimony, and confirmed that she previously testified that Amber and Brandy took her
phone off the television stand. (6/21/16 Tr., p.195, Ls.9-23.) On redirect, the
prosecutor asked Jennifer again about who took her cell phone, and she appeared to
answer that it was Brandy and Amber who both took her cell phone and wouldn’t give it
back to her. (6/21/16 Tr., p.202, Ls.2-19.)
12

II.
The Jury Was Not Properly Instructed On The Mental State Necessary For Robbery
Under An Aiding/Abetting Theory
A.

Introduction
If this Court concludes the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Bullock’s

conviction, then it must consider whether the jury was properly instructed on the mental
state necessary for liability under an aiding/abetting theory. The jury was not instructed
that the mental state required for aiding and abetting liability “is generally the same as
that required for the underlying offense—the aider and abettor must share the criminal
intent of the principal and there must [be] a community of purpose in the unlawful
undertaking.” Comment to Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 312 (citing Scroggins, 110
Idaho 380). This instruction was absolutely critical to this case, because, as defense
counsel correctly argued in closing, “this case all turns on intent” and “[Mr. Bullock’s]
intent was not to commit a robbery.” (6/21/16 Tr., p.246, L.15, p.247, Ls.12-13.) The
error in the jury instructions rises to the level of fundamental error because it violated
Mr. Bullock’s unwaived constitutional right to due process; it plainly exists; and it was
not harmless. Mr. Bullock is entitled to relief.

B.

Standard of Review
When reviewing jury instructions, this Court asks “whether the instructions as a

whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law.”

State v.

Jimenez, 159 Idaho 466, 469 (Ct. App. 2015). Mr. Bullock did not object to the jury
instructions in the trial court. “Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered
for the first time on appeal.

However, when a defendant fails to object to a jury
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instruction before the trial court, we will still review the jury instruction for fundamental
error.” Id. (citations omitted). To prove fundamental error, “the defendant bears the
burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more
of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for
any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).

C.

The District Court’s Error In Failing To Properly Instruct The Jury On The Mental
State Necessary For Robbery Under An Aiding/Abetting Theory Constitutes
Fundamental Error Because It Violated Mr. Bullock’s Unwaived Constitutional
Right To Due Process; It Plainly Exists; And It Was Not Harmless
Mr. Bullock can meet the high standard of demonstrating fundamental error here.

First, the district court’s error in failing to properly instruct the jury on the mental state
necessary for robbery under an aiding/abetting theory violated Mr. Bullock’s unwaived
constitutional right to due process. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. “‘In a criminal trial, the
State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due
process if it fails to give effect to that requirement.’” Jimenez, 159 Idaho at 470 (quoting
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (per curiam)). Where, as here, the jury
instructions omit an essential element of the offense, they violate the defendant’s right
to due process. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 166 (Ct. App. 2011).
Second, the error in the jury instructions plainly exists without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
Requiring error to be “plain is synonymous with requiring it to be “clear” or “obvious.”
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Sutton, 151 Idaho at 166. The error here was plain, clear, and obvious because the jury
was not instructed that the mental state required for aiding and abetting “is generally the
same as that required for the underlying offense—the aider and abettor must share the
criminal intent of the principal and there must [be] a community of purpose in the
unlawful undertaking.”

Comment to Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 312 (citing

Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380). This specific instruction was held to be a correct statement
of the law in State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 85-86 (Ct. App. 2011). In Reid, the Court of
Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that there was error in the jury instructions
because the jury was not instructed that it was required to find that the defendant
shared the mental state of premeditation with the actual killer. Id. at 85. The Court
explained:
[T]he jury instructions were appropriate under Scroggins and consistent
with the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, which are presumptively correct
statements of the law. Whether required or not, the jury was, in fact,
told . . . that the State must prove that [the defendant] shared [the killer’s]
mental state by requiring [the defendant] to have “shar[ed] the criminal
intent” of [the killer] such that [the defendant] and [the killer] had a
“community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.”
Id. at 86. In the instant case, such an instruction was necessary, and was not given.
Mr. Bullock cannot conceive of a tactical reason why trial counsel would not have
objected to the district court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on the required mental
state, considering Mr. Bullock’s mental state was the key issue in the case. No
information outside the record is necessary to determine that trial counsel’s failure to
object was not a strategic decision, but was simply a mistake.
Third, the error in the jury instructions was not harmless, because it altered the
outcome of the trial, and thus affected Mr. Bullock’s substantial rights. See Perry, 150
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Idaho at 226, 228. The jury asked one question during the course of its deliberations,
“What is the dictionary’s definition of ‘abetted’?” (6/22/16 Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.6, L.4; R.,
p.157.) The district court responded, in writing, “To abet another to commit a crime is to
command, procure, counsel, encourage, induce or assist.” (6/22/16 Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.6,
L.4; R., p.157.) The district court’s answer is true, as far as it goes, but failed to address
the necessary mental state for aiding/abetting liability. It is not enough that Mr. Bullock
assisted Brandy (and, arguably, Devon) in taking personal property from Jennifer
against her will, Mr. Bullock also had to share in Brandy and Devon’s criminal intent.
There had to be a community of purpose in the criminal offense, and the jury was never
instructed on that requirement, despite its obvious concern with the meaning of
“abetting.”

Considering the very weak evidence of Mr. Bullock’s criminal intent,

discussed above, the error in the jury instructions was not harmless because it affected
the outcome of the trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Bullock respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
remand this case to the district court with instructions that an acquittal be entered.
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Bullock’s
conviction, Mr. Bullock respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2017.

/s/ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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